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 Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 2 (March, 1999), 435-448
 A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTERIM EFFICIENCY
 WITH PUBLIC GOODS
 BY JOHN 0. LEDYARD AND THOMAS R. PALFREY1
 1. INTRODUCTION
 IN THIS PAPER, WE CONSIDER the following classical public goods problem. A group of
 individuals must decide on a level of a public good that is produced according to constant
 returns to scale up to some capacity constraint. In addition to deciding the level of public
 good, the group must decide how to tax the individuals in the group in order to cover the
 cost. The distribution of the burden of taxation is important because different individuals
 have different marginal rates of substitution between the private good (taxes) and the
 public good, and may have different incomes as well. These individual marginal rates of
 substitution are private information; that is, each individual knows his or her own
 marginal rate of substitution, but not those of the other members of the group. Adopting
 a Bayesian mechanism design framework, we assume that the distribution of marginal
 rates of substitution is common knowledge.
 We are interested in characterizing efficiency in this environment and are also
 interested in characterizing those mechanisms that one might expect to actually arise in
 practice. This suggests two approaches, one from normative considerations and one from
 positive considerations. On the normative side, we ask: What should an active planner (a
 mechanism designer) do? A well-known special case of this problem has been solved for
 one particular social welfare function (e.g., d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979)) that is
 insensitive to the distribution of cost shares. What distinguishes our work here is that we
 consider a planner who is maximizing a welfare function that is sensitive to the allocation
 of cost shares over the different valuation-types. Simply put, the planner may care who
 pays. This is represented formally by type-contingent welfare weights.
 Why might the consideration of such distributional goals be relevant? What rationale
 can be given for nonconstant welfare weights? Perhaps the simplest example to answer
 these questions corresponds to public decisions with zero production costs. Such cases
 are well-approximated in the real world by social legislation such as blue laws, smoking
 and drinking prohibitions, clothing requirements at beaches, and so forth. Suppose one is
 considering the implementation of one such social regulation. Many would argue that if
 implementation takes place, then the losers (i.e. those with a negative valuation to the
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 proposed regulation) should be compensated.2 But one runs into the (incentive compati-
 bility) problem that if you naively say you are going to compensate all losers, then
 everyone will claim to be a loser, possibly leading to production never occurring. A
 planner might want, therefore, to give some weight to the losers but not to the exclusion
 of all others. Obviously, in order to compensate the losers in such decisions, incentive
 taxes need to be carefully constructed that will achieve such type-contingent redistribu-
 tion, at least to the extent limited by incentive compatibility constraints. As we will show
 below, there is a direct and intuitive link between the desired degree of such compensa-
 tion and the corresponding distortions away from the Lindahl-Samuelson optimum. In
 this particular example, significant compensation of losers would necessitate a corre-
 sponding degree of underproduction relative to the classic solution. Other weighting
 schemes would correspond to other type-distributional goals, and could lead to either
 under- or overproduction.
 A second reason to consider nonconstant welfare weights arises if one concedes that
 this partial equilibrium model is embedded in a richer general equilibrium structure,
 where income or wealth distribution is a goal of the planner. If preferences for the public
 good are correlated with income or wealth in a systematic way, then the public good
 mechanism can be used as an instrument for redistribution, and unequal welfare weights
 would be a reflection of the planner's redistributive goals.
 A third rationale for unequal weights is more direct. For reasons that may have to do
 only remotely with issues of compensating losers or wealth redistribution, certain kinds of
 type-dependent cost-sharing may be deemed desirable on their own merits. A classic
 example of this is the class of proportional cost-sharing rules, whereby individuals valuing
 the public good more should bear a proportionally larger share of the costs (e.g., Jackson
 and Moulin (1992)). Such normative goals would correspond to a system of welfare
 weights that decrease in valuations in a particular way.
 For the positive approach to the mechanism design problem, we ask: What would we
 expect to see in practice? Here we are looking for a concept of efficiency or stability
 because one would expect inefficient or unstable mechanisms to be replaced by others.
 Under complete information, these concepts correspond to Pareto optimality and the
 core, respectively. Under asymmetric information the problem is a bit more subtle, and
 there remains no true consensus on the appropriate equivalent concepts.3 We therefore
 take a minimalist approach, and look at a natural extension of Pareto optimality to
 asymmetric information. In the analysis below we assume that all decisions, including
 whether to change the mechanism, are made at the interim stage-that is, when each
 agent knows his or her type, but not anyone else's type. If there is no communication,
 then the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms consists of those incentive
 compatible mechanisms for which it cannot be common knowledge that there is another
 mechanism which generates a unanimous improvement. We would expect therefore that
 surviving institutions would be, minimally, interim incentive efficient.
 Luckily we do not have to choose between normative and positive approaches to this
 problem. As pointed out in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), a mechanism is interim
 efficient if and only if there exist type-dependent social welfare weights for which that
 mechanism solves the planner's optimization problem subject to feasibility and incentive
 compatibility constraints. Thus, by varying the welfare weights in our planner's problem,
 2Sometimes, this requirement is implicitly imposed as a voluntary participation constraint.
 3See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), Cramton and Palfrey (1995), and Crawford (1985) for good
 discussions of the difficulties of extending these concepts to asymmetric information.
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 we map out the entire set of mechanisms that are interim incentive efficient. Thus, a
 complete solution to this problem, posed either from a normative or positive standpoint,
 is equivalent to fully characterizing the set of interim efficient mechanisms for the
 production of public goods in this framework.
 A complete characterization of interim efficiency has been done for the special case
 where the types are identically distributed and can only take on two values (Ledyard and
 Palfrey (1994)). There it was shown that optimal production always takes a special form
 in which the public good is provided if and only if the number of high valuation types
 exceeds a threshold number that depends on the welfare weights and the distribution of
 types. The greater the welfare weight on high valuation types, the lower the optimal
 threshold. With more than two types (as in this paper) the optimal mechanism generally
 depends on the exact profile of types in a more complicated way. In this paper, we fully
 characterize interim efficient mechanisms and obtain some comparative statics about
 how the optimal mechanism changes with the underlying distribution of types and with
 the welfare weights of the welfare function.
 Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 presents the characterization and its
 proof. Section 4 explains the intuition behind the characterization. In Section 5, we
 summarize these findings and offer some concluding remarks about some possible future
 directions of research.
 2. THE MODEL
 There are N people who must decide on the quantity, q, of a public good that is
 produced according to constant returns to scale4 and has a maximum level Y= 1. The
 cost of producing q E [0,1] is equal to Kq. In addition, they must decide how to distribute
 the production costs. Because of the linear production technology, the optimal level of
 the public good will always be either 0 or 1, so this is equivalent to a problem of deciding
 on whether or not to produce a discrete public good. We let a' denote individuals i's
 share of the cost, in units of the consumption of the private good, and assume it can take
 any real value. Therefore the set of feasible levels of production and cost shares are given
 by
 (a1,.. ., aN, q) E St X [0, 1]
 such that
 N
 Kq< Ea'.
 1=1
 Individual preferences are assumed to be risk-neutral and quasilinear in the level of
 public good production and the taxes (cost shares), so the utility to type v' of agent i for
 an allocation (q, a) is given by
 V' = v'q - a'.
 Thus, vi represents the marginal rate of substitution between the public and private
 good. We refer to v' as player i's "value." We assume that each individual knows his own
 value, vi, and does not know the values of the other individuals. We assume that the
 4We explain in the next section how the model and the results are easily extended to arbitrary
 production technologies.
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 individual values (vi) are independently distributed, with the (common knowledge) cdf of
 i's value denoted F(-) and the support of Fi is V' = [v', vi], where v' < K/N < -v. We
 assume Fi has a continuous positive density on VW. Note that v' < 0 is allowed.
 Clearly under these assumptions, our choice of normalization of the utility function is
 arbitrary up to an affine transformation. In particular, it is equivalent (in terms of
 individual decision theory) to the models of asymmetric information about contribution
 costs (a'), where utilities are normalized5 so that the marginal utility of the public good
 (v) equals 1, so that ui = q - (1/v1)a'. However, the class of ex-ante incentive efficient
 mechanisms (in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983)) will be different under the
 two normalizations.6 So, below, we will focus on the set of interim-incentive efficient
 mechanisms. That set is independent of whatever (type dependent) normalization one
 chooses.
 A mechanism consists of a message space for each agent and an outcome function
 mapping message profiles into probability distributions over the set of feasible alloca-
 tions. By the revelation principle, the properties (in terms of allocations) of any optimal
 mechanism can be duplicated by an incentive compatible, direct mechanism in which the
 message space for agent i is simply the set of possible types (values) in the support of Fi.
 A strategy for i is a mapping o- : Vi - Vi, that is, a decision rule that specifies a reported
 type for each possible type. We refer to the identity mapping as the truthful strategy. By
 the linearity of the individual utility functions, there is also no loss of generality in
 restricting attention to deterministic mechanisms. Thus, we denote a feasible direct
 mechanism simply as a function
 r7: VN (_(a, ,...,aN ,q) ER NX [0,1]1 a' >2Kq
 We denote the public good allocation component of q at type profile v by q(v), and
 the private good tax for i by ai(v).
 Besides feasibility, the main restriction on iq is that it be incentive compatible, which
 means that it is a Bayesian equilibrium of iq for all agents to adopt a strategy of truthfully
 reporting their type. Given a strategy profile o-': V -- V' and a mechanism, 71, let the
 interim utility of type v' of agent i, assuming all others truthfully report their type, be
 denoted by:
 ui2v7 o-V ) =f__ [v'q(o- (v )v- )-a'(ou'(v'),v-)]dF(vIv').
 Let u'(7q, v i2-Ui,V',I) where I denotes the truthful strategy I(v)=v. Then iq is
 incentive compatible if and only if u '7, Vi) 2 Uiq, Vi, 0_ i) for all vi, ro i.
 The set of interim incentive efficient allocation rules7 can be represented as the
 solutions to a set of maximization problems. Let A > 0 be a system of welfare weights, a
 profile of measurable functions mapping types into the positive real line such that
 fL6 Aj(v')dFj(v') = 1 Vi, where Ai(v') represents the welfare weight assigned to type v' of
 5This normalization can be made as long as vi > O.
 6The fact that ex ante efficiency is sensitive to utility normalizations is discussed in Ledyard and
 Palfrey (1994, p. 333).
 7For the remainder, we simply refer to such allocations as "interim efficient."
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 agent i. Then iq is interim efficient if and only if there is a A such that iq maximizes
 YJIf,7i`Ai(v')ui(Th v')dFi(v') over the set of feasible and incentive compatible mechanisms.8
 We now proceed to characterize this set.
 3. THE CHARACTERIZATION
 As indicated above, we represent interim efficient rules as a solution to a constrained
 maximization problem. First we need to identify incentive compatible mechanisms in a
 useful way.
 For smooth mechanisms, when preferences are linear, the characterization of incentive
 compatibility in terms of derivatives is well-known. There are basically two features of
 such mechanisms. First, an envelope condition is satisfied, namely that the total deriva-
 tive of the interim utility for i with respect to type when players adopt truthful strategies
 is equal to the partial derivative with respect to type (i.e., fixing the reports of all agents).
 Second, the interim utility to i under truthful reporting is convex in i's type. This is
 stated formally below, without proof.
 LEMMA (Rochet (1987)): If tV is linear in v' and 71 is twice continuously differentiable,
 then 7 is incentive compatible if and only if
 (i) V7iu (7, v ) = V,)iu i(n, v, I),
 (ii) uii(, vi) is convex in V'.
 For our problem V7,iu'(7q, v') = Qi(v') f Iv-iq(v)dF(v vi). So u' is convex in v' if and
 only if Q(v) ? 0 V v'. Using these facts we can see that a mechanism (q, a) is interim
 efficient if and only if there is a A such that (q,a) solves maxfvYJiAi(vi)(viq(v)-
 a'(v))dF(v) subject to 0 < q(v) < 1 V v, QX(v) > 0 Vi, vi, 7,iu'(v ) = V,i u(v', I) V i, vi,
 and -ia'(v) = Kq(v) V v.
 Using the approach of Mirrlees (1971) and Wilson (1993) we construct the Lagrangian
 equivalent problem
 max min fv A(vi)ui(mv i)d F(vi)
 + Ef J(vi)[u$,i(,, V') - ^i(G7, V, I)] dv'
 fi
 + 8(v4 Eai(v) -Kq(v)] dv subject to:
 vi
 0<q(v)<1 VveV,
 QX(v') 2 O SVi viEvi
 where t/i and 8 are multipliers for (first order) incentive compatibility and feasibility,
 respectively. Applying Green's Theorem and substituting the identity u'C(r, vi) =
 8See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
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 Ua(G1, v', I) converts the maximization problem to:
 max min E fi (1 v(j,i, I)[ Aj(vi)fi(vi) - I)]
 71 i c Ai v'
 -Ii(vi)l2G7, Uv I)}dv' + A 8(v)( Ea'(v) - Kq(v)) dv
 + E f ui(u, v j, I&.(vi) .(vi) dv' subject to:
 O <q(v) < 1 /v E V,
 QI(vi) > 0 Vi vi E vi
 where 8V' denotes the boundary of V' and (i points outward at vi.
 We are now in a position to give a complete characterization of the class of interim
 efficient mechanisms.
 THEOREM 1: (q*, a*) is an interim efficient mechanism if and only if 3A ? 0 with
 fLVA(v')dF'(v') = 1 Vi, such that:
 (a) V v, q*(v) maximizes (Y3iw'(vL) - K} subject to:
 0 <q(v) < 1 Vv E V,
 QI(vi) 2 0 \Vi, vi EVi, where
 F - Fi () f 1iAi( t') dFi( t')
 and (b) a*i(v) = flji't'dQ*(t ) + ac(v) where
 a'i(v) =Kq*(v) - EfvtdQ(t) Vv and
 a~~~~
 _ Vf a'(v)dF(vlv') = 0 Vi, v.
 PROOF: A sketch is given. For further details see Ledyard and Palfrey (1996).
 Notice that the restriction of A to fji"Ai(v')dF(v') = 1 Vi is without loss of generality.
 Since utilities are linear in the transfers, for some welfare weights total welfare can be
 made arbitrarily large simply by making ex ante transfers from one individual to another
 individual. That is, if, for two agents i and j, it were the case that
 f iAi(v )dFi(v ) < fJ A. (vi)dFj(v ),
 _ V~~~~~~~~~I)
 then total welfare could be made arbitrarily large by making ex ante transfers of the
 private good from i to j. Thus, a solution to the maximization problem only exists when
 the welfare weights are, in expectation, the same for all agents. Thus, without loss of
 generality, we restrict the welfare weights to satisfy
 Jv Ai(s)dFi(s) = 1 vi.
 v
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 We can write (*) as
 maxn JV[n E (Ai(V )- (i))(v q (v1)- a'v)) - ii q (u5)] dF(v)
 + 8 (v)(Ea'(v) -Kq(v)) dv + E[ &i(-vi)t2i(-vi) - _i(v')u(v)]
 v i i
 From the first order conditions with respect to a'(v), 8(v), and 1&i(vu) we obtain, for
 V1 < Vi < Vi,
 (1) - (Aj(vi)fi(vi) - lkl(vi)) + y(v)fi(vi) = 0,
 (2) E a(v i) ?0Kq(v) If iy(v)>0,
 (3) fA ai(v) dF(vIvI) A'(vi) = v QV(vi) Vi, Vi
 dvl v-i
 where y(v) = 8(v)/f(v).
 From (1) it follows that y is constant in v. Integration of (1) gives &(vW)=
 Fi(v')(Ai-(v) - y) + C where A-(v') is the expected value of Ai conditional on i's
 valuation being less than or equal to v'.
 Part (b) of the theorem9 follows from (2) and (3).
 Finally, the continuity of t/i along with the first order conditions for ai at v' and -v'
 imply that t&i(v') = &i(-vL) = 0. So C = 0 and y fjt,Ai(v)dFi(v') = 1. Substituting all of
 this into (**) implies that we must find q* to solve
 max f [E (vi K K](v) dF(v) subject to:
 0<q(v)?<1 VvV, QED.
 (VW) 2 0 li, vi E vi V.
 REMARK: The technique above applies equally to the case of general production
 functions. Let C(q) be the cost of producing a public good level equal to q. First observe
 that the incentive compatibility constraints do not depend on C(q). As a consequence,
 substitution of the incentive constraints results in the program:
 max f[E( v i(Ui)) q(v) - C(q) dF(v) subject to:
 q, fX f. i _
 9The existence of such an a for any given q was first shown by d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet
 (1979). One a that satisfies (b) is
 a N(v)= q() Qi ) +N-1 1Qi (Vi)]- 1 E f' sjdQj*(sj).
 N N- ILQ(VJ) N -IL
 - jo~~~N i pA j-Ai -J
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 The only regularity assumptions needed to guarantee a solution are that C is nondecreas-
 ing in q and that
 [t q i(vi) q(v) -C(q)]
 has a solution for every valuation profile, v. The corresponding taxes are then con-
 structed in a manner similar to part (b) of the theorem. Therefore, this general approach
 can be applied to problems with increasing or decreasing returns to scale, U-shaped
 average cost functions, and even lumpy public goods10 with fixed costs and "jumps" in
 the cost function.
 4. INTERPRETING THE CHARACTERIZATION
 4.1. Virtual Cost-Benefit Criterion
 Call
 wi(vi) = vi - F(v) (A (vi) - 1),
 type v' of agent i's virtual valuation (a la Myerson). Suppose"1 wi(vi) 2 0 Vi, v'. Then,
 since Q*(v')=prob(1j.iwj(vj)? K-wi(v')) it will be true that Q'(vi)20 is never
 binding. So for (A, F) such that w(vi) 2 0 Vi, vi, interim efficient q*(v) satisfy
 q*(v) = 1 if Ewi(vi) ? K,
 i
 = 0 otherwise.
 This is a virtual cost-benefit criterion.12 The virtual utility has a familiar interpretation
 (see, for example, Myerson (1981)). It equals the "true" public good valuation of the
 vi-type inflated13 by a factor that depends on the distribution of types and on the welfare
 weights. The benchmark case is the one where Ai(v') = 1 for all i and v'. In this case the
 first best optimal level of public good is 1 or 0 depending only on whether or not
 Y_Jv' - (K/N)] ? 0. That is, produce if and only if the sum of the marginal rates of
 substitution exceeds the marginal production cost. This is the Lindahl-Samuelson solu-
 tion, precisely the solution investigated in most previous papers on the optimal provision
 of public good. (See d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979).) This simplification arises
 because the allocation of the private good (i.e., the incidence of the taxes on different
 types) does not affect social welfare. For this reason, incentive compatibility does not
 reduce social welfare relative to the first best solution. However, it must be emphasized
 1 These are sometimes referred to as threshold or step-level public goods. The simplest kind is
 just a binary public good, which is mathematically equivalent to the standard model presented in
 Section 2: constant returns with a maximum capacity.
 This is the so-called "regular" case, where the second order condition is never binding.
 12Notice that similar (ex post) virtual cost-benefit conditions characterize the second-best opti-
 mum in the case of nonlinear production technologies, provided the second order condition is
 satisfied.
 13This could be deflated if A -(vi) > 1.
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 that this is a very special case. It is in fact the only system of welfare weights where
 incentive compatibility does not cause distortions relative to the first best solution.14
 To better understand the intuition behind the virtual valuations, one can think of the
 mechanism operating in the following way. Each agent (truthfully) reports a valuation. If
 the public good is produced, then each agent pays the incentive tax, which equals a
 constant plus that agent's valuation minus his "informational rent," (1 -Fi(vi))/fi(vi).
 Recall from standard incentive theory that this is the amount that can be extracted from
 an agent, given incentive constraints. Of course, in this public good problem, the
 objective of the mechanism is not to extract rent from agents, so any excess incentive tax
 will be distributed lump sum back to the agents, by adjusting the incentive tax by a
 constant. Thus, if the good is provided, the government spends K to produce the public
 good and makes a lump-sum refund, which is formally captured by the constant (i.e.
 independent of v0) that is added to each agent's incentive tax. The portion of this refund
 that comes from type v' of agent i equals
 i . 1 -Fi(vi) -K
 v Msvi) N
 There are two other terms that complete the social cost/benefit picture, as it concerns
 type v' of agent i. One is simply that producing the public good, produces a direct benefit
 of v' to agent i, which is valued socially as Ai(v')v'. Last, but not least, is the fact that
 the incentive tax (before refund) is a social cost, and this social cost equals
 Aij( Vi )Vi _ fv ' Ai (t') dF (ti )
 Collecting all these terms, gives us type v' of agent i's contribution to the marginal net
 social value of producing the public good. Denoting this by wi(v'), gives us
 [ j~fA(t 0)dJ(t') 1 [ 1-F(v') K]
 ii3'(v') =Ai(v')v' - [Ai(v )V - f1v') ] ? l - f-(MO NJ
 1 -F( i) fiA (t )dF(ti) K
 =v - f (vi) ? f (vi) N
 K
 = wi(vi) - K
 which is the cost adjusted virtual valuation of type vl of agent i.
 Notice that in the special case of neutral distributional weights, fjk,Ai(t')dFi(t') 1 -
 Fi(v'), so that
 Ai( Vi) i A -v W)( )dF; (t ) i - Fi(W')
 14Actually, this is the only system of welfare weights for which a first best solution exists. For any
 other weights, welfare can be arbitrarily increased by shifting the allocation of the private good to
 one particular type of some individual. Since we impose no feasibility bounds on the allocation of
 the private good, this means that the first best solution does not exist. Of course, with incentive
 compatibility constraints, the second-best problem is well defined.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 00:42:12 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 444 J. 0. LEDYARD AND T. R. PALFREY
 and as a result there are no welfare costs associated with charging the incentive taxes in a
 type-dependent way and then redistributing them back in a lump sum fashion. Otherwise
 there is a cost to doing this.
 The form of virtual utilities also makes it easy to see how distortions away from the
 classic optimum are related to the welfare weights. For example, if Ai is decreasing in
 type then generally the interim efficient solution calls for underproduction relative to the
 Lindahl-Samuelson solution, since qji(v') is positive for all types. That is, the virtual
 valuations are always less than true valuations, so the sum of the true valuations must
 more than exceed the production cost in order for production to be optimal. Conversely,
 if Ai is increasing in type, then there should be overproduction relative to the Lindahl-
 Samuelson solution.
 4.2. Second Order Conditions
 The discussion above assumes monotone virtual utilities, which ensures that maximiza-
 tion of the relaxed program, without the Q"(v') 2 0 constraint, automatically satisfies
 that constraint. It is straightforward to see what is required for virtual utilities to be
 monotone in type, and this provides a nice intuition for how our results differ from
 standard incentive problems of this type (e.g. Guesnerie and Laffont (1984)). From above,
 1 -Fi(v') ? . Ai(t')dF (t')
 fi= t(Vi) + f (vi)
 The first term, vi, is clearly increasing in v'. The second term, (1 - F)/f, the
 informational rent, is typically assumed to be monotone in v' in adverse selection models
 in private goods environments, by requiring the distribution to satisfy a monotone hazard
 rate condition.
 Since the incidence of incentive taxes can have welfare effects, there is a third term to
 worry about, indicating that one may need more (or sometimes less!) than the standard
 monotone hazard rate condition to guarantee that Q'(v') 2 0 is automatically satisfied
 when one simply plugs in virtual utilities and maximizes subject only to production
 feasibility. These additional conditions will imply restrictions on the distribution of
 welfare weights, as we illustrate in the example below.
 4.3. Example
 Let v be distributed uniformly on [0, 1] for all i, so F(v) = v and f(v) = 1. Then
 w(v) = 2v - f "A(t)dt and w' = 2 - A(v). Therefore, the second order condition is globally
 satisfied for uniform distributions of valuations if the maximum welfare weight is less
 than or equal to 2. Thus, if A(v) = 2(a + bv)/(2a + b), where a ? 0 and 2a + b > 0, then
 we are always in the "regular" case where virtual valuations are monotonic in type and
 the second order conditions are satisfied. If b > 0 (high valuation types receive more
 weight) then production will occur more often than in the Lindahl-Samuelson solution,
 while if b < 0, the reverse is true. However, there are A such that virtual valuations are
 decreasing, even for the uniform distribution. For example, if A(v) = 3v2, then virtual
 valuations are decreasing for v > 2/3. The optimal solution in this case will involve
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 equal treatment of all types with valuations above some v* < 1; Qi = 1 for all such
 types.15
 If K < 1, the solution above is straightforward, because the Qi obtained from the
 relaxed problem is in fact weakly increasing, even though the virtual valuations are
 decreasing in some region.16 The reason why Qi obtained from the relaxed problem is
 nondecreasing is that virtual valuations are decreasing only for very high values of v,
 where w(v) > 1. So, when K < 1, the relaxed solution sets Qi = 1 whenever w(v) > 1 for
 at least one agent, and all these high types are treated the same. But in general, for
 higher values of K, the relaxed solution may produce violations of the second order
 condition-i.e. Qi decreasing in some region. In such cases, one applies a procedure
 called ironing (Rochet and Chone (1998)). The principle behind this procedure is to
 flatten out Qi in the decreasing region (and for some adjacent types as well). The
 geometry is illustrated clearly in a series of figures in Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) for
 the -single agent case.
 It is also instructive to use this example to illustrate the range of public good provision
 rules (or cost-benefit criteria) that are interim efficient. Suppose N = 2, K = 1. The
 Lindahl-Samuelson efficient outcome is to produce if and only if the average valuation
 exceeds 1/2, so the public good will be provided half the time.
 Next suppose one shifts welfare weight to the low valuation types, to the point where
 A(v) = 2 for all v < 1/2 and A(v) = 0 for all v > 1/2. This satisfies monotonicity of
 virtual valuations17 and it is easy to see that the optimal mechanism is to produce if and
 only if the sum of valuations exceeds 3/2. In other words, this weighting scheme
 effectively inflates the cost of the public good by 50 percent, so it should be produced
 only if the actual benefit/cost ratio exceeds 1.5. At first blush it seems as though this
 mechanism could be improved, since there are some states where both agents are "high"
 types (i.e. v > 1/2 for both of them), and the public good is not provided. Since all high
 types receive the same welfare weight, and since low types do not bear any of the cost of
 production in these states, it would seem to lead to an improvement in welfare. Why
 doesn't this lead to an improvement? The answer is that the mechanism is designed to
 achieve redistributive goals in addition to deciding on public good production. In this
 case, the welfare weights indicate that there should be a transfer from high valuation to
 low valuation types. Hence in the optimal mechanism there are some states where there
 is one low type and one high type, and the public good is not produced, but a private
 good transfer takes place between the low and high types. The extent of such transfers
 would be hindered by greater public good production due to incentive compatibility
 problems. We conjecture that this choice of welfare weights corresponds to the lowest
 possible expected output (Q = .125) of all interim efficient mechanisms for the uniform
 case with N= 2 and K= 1.
 15Similarly, if A(v) = 3(1 - v)2 the optimal solution will involve equal treatment of all types with
 valuations below some v* < 0; Qi = 0 for all such types.
 16In other words, this is an example demonstrating why monotonicity of w is not a necessary
 condition for the second order conditions to be satisfied.
 17If one shifts the welfare weights even further downward, so that A(v) =A > 2 for all v < 1/A
 and A(v) = 0 for all v > 1/A, then the virtual valuations are nonmonotonic and ironing must be
 done. Nevertheless, from the characterization in Theorem 1, it is easy to verify that standard ironing
 procedures can be used and will generate an optimal mechanism with the same property: produce if
 and only it the sum of valuations exceeds 3/2.
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 At the other extreme, suppose the welfare weights are shifted in the opposite
 direction, with A(v) = 2 for all v > 1/2 and A(v) = 0 for all v < 1/2. In this case the
 optimal mechanism is to produce if and only if the sum of valuations exceeds 1/2. In
 other words, the cost of the public good is effectively deflated by 50 percent, so that it
 should be produced if the actual benefit/cost ratio is at least .5. Again it would seem that
 efficiency would dictate that when both types are "low" types, the good should never be
 produced. However, redistributive goals implied by this welfare weighting scheme require
 the low types to subsidize the cost of the public good. The most efficient way to perform
 this subsidization requires some "overproduction" of the public good. We conjecture that
 this choice of welfare weights corresponds to the highest possible expected output
 (Q = .875) of all interim efficient mechanisms for the uniform case with N = 2 and K = 1.
 5. CONCLUSIONS
 In this paper, we have characterized the interim efficient public good allocation rules
 in a simple Bayesian public good environment. We find that the optimal mechanism
 involves either more or less production of the public good depending on whether the
 welfare weights are shifted in the direction of types with higher or lower valuations for
 the public good. Thus, compared to the classical optimal level of public good provision
 (the "Lindahl-Samuelson" solution), there should generally be some distortion. The
 reason for this distortion is that unless welfare weights are perfectly neutral, efficient
 allocations will depend in general on both the level of public good and the incidence of
 taxes to finance the public good. Because of incentive compatibility, the efficient way to
 reduce the tax burden on low-valuation (resp: high-valuation) consumers is to reduce
 (resp: increase) the level of provision of the public good. In the borderline case, the
 first-best solution is attainable only because the welfare function is independent of
 distribution of the private good.
 There are several directions worth pursuing. One direction is to explore the use of
 simple mechanisms. The public good mechanisms proposed here involve complicated
 transfer schemes that can necessitate the use of very large taxes and subsidies. In a
 companion paper (Ledyard and Palfrey (1998)) we explore simple mechanisms in large
 populations, and show that for any interim efficient allocation rule there exists a simple
 dominant-strategy referendum mechanism that perfectly approximates the efficiency of
 that allocation rule. In a referendum, individuals simply submit a binary message (a
 "vote") either for or against production of the public good. If a sufficiently large fraction
 of the individuals vote in favor, then the public good is provided and the costs are
 distributed equally in the population. Otherwise, the public good is not produced. This
 provides an approximate "welfare theorem" for public goods: efficient allocation rules
 can be (approximately) decentralized by an appropriately chosen voting rule. Moreover, if
 there is a common value component to the distribution of preferences, then the optimal
 referendum is unique. We prove this by approximating the solution to the optimal
 mechanism where the second order condition is ignored. Thus a by-product is the result
 that the second order conditions are inconsequential in large economies.
 There are several other directions. Participation constraints were not imposed in our
 solution for the optimum. It is fairly easy to show that when these constraints are
 binding, this implies a reduction in the level of the public good, since these constraints
 are necessarily binding on the low valuation types (Ledyard and Palfrey (1994)). It is also
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 true that, except in uninteresting cases, these constraints will imply QN - 0 in large
 populations (Ledyard and Palfrey (1994), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990)). But for the
 case of large N, it would usually seem more realistic to assume that participation is
 generally obligatory to all members of the group under consideration, as we have
 assumed here. Related to the general issue of participation is the application of the
 general approach presented here to excludable public goods. In that case, participation
 constraints can be relaxed by the (no-cost) exclusion of low valuation types.
 More involved extensions, such as relaxing the assumption of independent types,
 consideration of utility functions where the valuation parameter enters nonlinearly, or
 introducing multidimensional types, appear to be more difficult open questions. Finally,
 as we remarked at the end of Section 3, the analysis is easily extended to accommodate
 arbitrary production technologies.
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